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CHAPTER I 
V~ff THE EMPHASIS NOW? 
During the past few years the American people have 
given more attention to the subjeot of old-age pensions, than 
at any previous time in our history. The problem and all of 
its oomplex ramifioations have been argued in courts, in class-
rooms, in homes, around collective bargaining tables and on the 
street. The eyes of the employer. the employee, the government 
and the general public have been focused on old-age security_ 
The basic problem is how to reasonably assure workers 
a decent standard of living when they reach the age at which 
they can no longer be gainfully employed. It is apparent that 
this is not a new problem for this country. \~by then has this 
problem become so prominent during the past decade, and why is 
it so much in the news today? 
There is perhaps no one reason why the subject of 
pensions has attained such importance, but this is due rather 
to e. combination of events. The main reason which indirectly 
effects all others is that our population is an aging popula-
1 
2 
, 1 
tion. Steinhaus says that~ 
Due to great progress in the field of medical 
science, chemistry and sanitation, the life expectancy 
of individuals has greatly increased. It may be said 
that two causes are Oat work. Progress in new tyues of 
medicine and treatment, publicity campai~s call1ng 
attention to various tyP&S of diseases arid improvement 
of dia~ostic treatment have not only greatly reduced 
morta11t~, but have lessened the severlty of these dis-
eases and hence the younger generation is healthier as 
it approaches old age. ' 
Except for an increase during the two war periods the birth 
rate in knerica has been steadily declining. The tightening 
of our immigration laws l which resulted in a great reduction 
in immigration has also been a contributory factor to aging 
our population. 
It is not improbable that in 1960, there will be 
18,000,000 people over 65 years of age in our population. 
There would then be one aged person for every five persons 
of productive years. If there were a laboring force of sixty 
million workers there would be thirty aged for every hundred 
workers_2 It is no wonder that the problem is before the eyes 
Board, 
1 F'inanc~ Old Age, 
New York, l~ 12. 
2 Ibid., 16. 
National Industrial Conference 
~---------------------------------~--______________ W __ .l __ ~~ 
of many Americans today. 
There have been other factors also Whioh have played 
their part in lJringing the problem of old age security into the 
spotlight •. The Social Security Act effeotive in 1937 provided 
. 
some pension coverage to many workers and. stimulated industry 
and employees to think of some means of providing for old age. 
The 191a Revenue Act provided legislative encouragement in our 
tax laws for employers to make provisions for the old age se-
curity of their workers.; 
During the past decade we have been living in an un-
usual economic period. The shadow of war has cast its ugly 
pallor over our lives, and as yet, the sunshine of peace has 
not filtered through. During the war years high excess profit 
taxes and other taxes on income encouraged industry to estab-
lish pension plans beoause through tax deduotion, the U. S. 
paid. a substantial part of the oost.4 With the shortage of man-
power some industries offered pension plans as an inducement 
to obtain Vi.rorkers. In the post 'V'l8.r period some of the larger 
unions bargained for pension benefits in lieu of wage increases, 
. 
; "Employee Retirement Plans " Round Table Discussion Contin~ntal Illinois National Bank and trust Company of ChIoago, 
1950, h. 
4 Ibid. 
4 
because increased wages pursuing increased prices was a futile 
chase. The Inland Steel Case, whicb shall be discussed later, 
in which it was decided that pensions were within the proper 
soope of collective bargaining, also focused the spotlight on 
pensions and was a further inducelnent for unions to press for 
pension benefits. 
~be above mentioned Jvents with the underlying factor 
that we are an aging population are the reasons Why Americans 
are very pension conscious today. 
Since the solution of the problem of providing se~ 
curity for old age means so muoh to everyone, it is important 
that we solve the problem adequately. Keeping workers on the 
job as long as possible would seem a help in solving the pro-
blem. As has been pointed out previously, due to great pro-
gress in drugs and medical science, not only has mortality de-
creased, but the population on the whole is healthier and should 
. 
oarry added vitality into their old age. This means that from 
a physical standpoint, many workers should be able to work be-
yond the age of 65. 
The number of older workers available for work is 
. 
large. A survey among beneficiaries under the Social Security 
Act revealed that about fifty per cent of the benefioiaries 
5 
are willing to work, thirty-seven per cent of all benefici-
aries would accept any kind of work without qualifications 
and the remainder have some qualifications as to type of workt5 
During World War II a great number of aged mrkers 
demonstrated their ability to Work and work well. The War Man-
power Commission reported on the experience of employers with 
older workers. 
It was indicated that even in the oases Where the 
produotion of the aged per time vnit was relatively 
less than that of younger workers, the experience, judg-
ment, oonoentration, carefulness and pa~ienoe of the 
older workers are oompensating faotors which pay divi-
dends in quality of product, salvage from waste and re-jeots, and often in the long run, output. It 6 ' 
111ere are, thcH'efore, and there will be large num ... 
bel'S of aged workers who are ready, willing and able to work. 
As OfNeil17 says, however, 
it may be argued that keeping older ~rkers on the 
payroll represents a hidd3n~nsion cost. Usually the 
oldest workers are drs.vling the hiO'hest wages, 'VIhile 
-many are semi-efficient and thererore are belng paid 
more than their actual productive worth. It rnay also 
be said that keeping older employees on the job tends 
to stagnate a business because the promotion of younger 
5 ~by Beneficiaries Retire, Social Security Bulle-
tin, January, 19tiS. . 
6 Older Workers in Wartime, Monthly Labor ReView, 
August, 1944, 2'16. 
7 Modern Pension Pla~s, Prentice-Hall, New York, 
~1~~6~. ____________________________________ __ 
·---------------------------------------------------------~ 
6 
workers would be curtailed. their morale lowered, and 
therefore no new, stimulatlng ideas would be injected 
into the industry. Under these oonditions it is also 
assumed that the turnover of younger workers would in-
orease thereby adding a cost. 
Granting that there is some merit in the argu..ments 
. 
against keeping older workers on the job, it seems that there 
is muoh room for research as how to b3St utilize the exper-
ienoe, skills and even hobbies of the aged While at the same 
time keeping avenues of adva..'1oement open for younger em-
ployees.S Little work has been done on this project, but with 
our aging population, it is important that we explore all 
possibilities to solve our problem. 
Is it possible to answer the basic problem by having 
each individual worker save enough during his working years to 
provide seourity for his old age? If each worker could and 
would save enough to provide for his old age, t~e problem 
'WOul.d be solved. The plain fact is however that most workers 
do not make enough money to save for their old age. Then too, 
savings of the individual worker are not always secure. En-
tire savings oan be wiped out in a short tim. by sickness or 
an accident. High taxes, low interest, periods of .inflation, 
8 Henry Steinhaus, Financi~ Old Age, National In-
dustrial Conference Board, New Ioi'k,'t9, ttl. 
7 
not only make it difficult to save, 'but eat into money that 
has been saved. If a ~rker loses some or all of his savings 
late in life, it becomes almost impossible for him to ITAke up 
enough to provide any security for his old age. The costs of 
purchase in investments or annuities by an average worker are 
prohibitive. Moreover, the return on snmll holdings is too 
meager to provide old age security for the worker. 
Even though at the present time most workers cannot 
and do not save or invest enough to provide security for their 
later years, the writer feels that much more can be done in 
this al~ea towards solvip..g the basic problem. A more 'equitable 
distribution of 'Jealth and income is necessary, in order that 
workers might have an opportunity to save. Various forms of 
. 
social insurance, especially health insurance, should be avail-
able to all, so shock losses will not have to be absorbed by 
the individual. Workers could be given an opportunity to study 
how to spend, invest and save prudently. 
l'he best answer to providing security for old age 
seems to be pensions. A pension provides a de£ini te iIlco~le to 
the worker when he reaches the age When he can no longer be 
. 
gainfully employed. If a worker is assured of a certain in-
come when he reaches retirement age, he can approach that a.ge 
L-____________________________________________________ _______ 
3 
without fear of want and with an air of self-dependence. 
Pensions in themselves, however while providing the 
best answer to this complex problem facing America, are not a 
cure-all. Even in this age one oannot get sOIlething for noth-
in~. Pensions oost money. Pe~sions must be set up on a fi-
nancially and actuarially sound basis. Pensions should be ade-
quate. Pensions are a ve~J important part of the overall 
answer to the pl'oblem of financial secul'ity for the aged. In 
this respect it is well to remember Ilthat the finanoial se-
curity of the aged basically rests on conservative finanoing 
of governInent. If the soundness of the ourrency is impaired, 
and inflationary price rises follow, the aged are hardest 
hit. ff9 
One of the most important problems that is nOVJ fao-
ing the United States and one that ~ill become much more acute 
is hO'1 to provide financial security for the aged. Mu.ch re-
. 
search and VlO rk must be done particularly in the areas of em-
ployment for the aged and distribution of income so that 
workers can save, in order to solve this problem. Pensions 
however, have a m.ost important part to play in providing an 
. 
answer to this serious and complex problem. 
9 Ibid, lto. ~ _____________________ • __ U_'. _________ B~ _______________ ~ ....___ • 
CHAPTER II 
WHO SHALL PROVIDE THE PENSION? 
Since pensions play such an important role in pro-
viding financial security for ~he aged it is well to ask who 
is going to provide the pension. It oan be said that pensions 
will be provided either by government, by private industry or 
by a oombination of. government and private plans. wbich of 
these systems is best for providing pensions in the United 
States"{ 
Under a plan wherein the government provides the 
pension many more workers would be covered than under a plan 
,mere pensions are provided by private industry. The Federal 
Reserve BulletinlO indicates that: 
under the New Social Security Amendments (HR 6000) 
which were effectbre January Ii 1'151, approximately 
three-fourths of the employed abor force is covered 
by Soclal Security. About nine aillion excluded per-
. sons are in agricUlture self-employed, unpaid family 
workers, ana J.rregular ~.ired workers. Another :nillion 
is comprised of non .... farm self-employed persons includ-
ing both s-0ccii'ical1;y designatcd- groups of professionals 
and persons with selr.emp1oJment J.ncome below the speci-
fied minimlhTft. The other major ~roups excluded COl"lpl?ise 
persons covered by existing pub~ic retirement systems. 
10 Business Conditions, A Review by the Federa.l Re-
serve Bank of CUJ.cago l September, 195~, 1. 
9 
'-___________________________ M_' __ _ 
10 
Private pension plans could not provide this broad 
coverage. Liillions of wo rkers in agrioulture and millions who 
Vlork for sl1all f'iF1S would be without ooverage. :if a total 
labor force.exceeding sixty-two million at present, forty-three 
million are non-agricultural employees ani only abo11t fifteen 
million of these are muonized.11 Wnile it ~s true that pri-
vate pension plans can and will be expanded to cover more 
'WOrkers than are presently cover6d, they calmot cover the mil-
lions that are ~overed under a plan 1t'Lhe re the government pro-
vides the pension. 
?riv'ate pension plB..l'1s tend to restrict the rn.obility 
of labor, whereas this undesirable feab.1re is practioally 
eliTlJ.inated in r'etirement plans provided by the goverIL'1lent. A 
worker may be reluctant'to change jobs, eYan for a better oppor-
tunity, if he must peli:nquish his pension rights. This is es-
peoially true in non-contributory plans vJhere pension rights 
generally CD not attach to the \~orker. Since so many indus-
tries are covered in the same maImer uniteI' a government plan, 
a. worker is free in this l"espect to take advantaces of oppor-
tunities v,hich m.ay require a change. ch C8.I). be done in pri-
. 
vate plans to cover all ViUrkers in an area 01' an industry in 
11 Ibid, 12. 
~-------------------------------------,----------------------
11 
the same plan, but as yet little has been done in this regard. 
Vesting vihich would allow the "worker to take his pension rights 
with hin could also L~prove this situation for private plans, 
but wuuld increase the cost. 
. 
Under the private retirement plans, there is a ten-
dency to discriminate against the {'Il.der V4urkers in hiring, be-
cause of the higher pension cost involved. lhere the govern-
ment provides the pension, reluctance to hire older workers 
because of this reason is minimized. 
It is apparent therefore that there are definite ad-
vantages in having governUlent provide pensions. Is it wise 
however to turn the entire pension problem over to the govern-
ment', Cannot part of this lJroblem be handled on a lower level'? 
Is it not possible to cmilbine governm.ent aud private pensions'? 
Not only is it possible .. but this is the very way pension 
trends have evolved in the United States, and it seems to be 
the best solution. 
Ijne govel~nment· -I;hrough 01d Age and Survivors In-
suranoe (Sooial Seourity) provides the 1'1001' on which private 
pensions mal buila. This is basic and essential. Arthur J. 
,---------. "'---...--_-
12 
Altmeyer,12 Social Security Administrator Commissioner recently 
stated, 
ttl think some of us tend to fo rget at time s that 
the effectiveness and value of supplementary security 
measures a~e largely dependent upon the existence of 
a basic progr&~ which ca~ be supplemented. The multi-
plication of many special and l~mited ~lans is no real 
substitute for a basic program. This lssue was debated 
at length in 1935 When the original Social Security Act 
was under consideration. There was considerable sup-
port for pronosa1s which would have permitted the sub-
stitution of~separate employer retira~ent 'Olans for 
covera~e under the basic program. It was recognized 
that they muld make difflcult or impossible tlie assur-
ance of basic security to workers who ohanged employ-
ment, and that there would still be room for special 
retirement plans to supplement the basic program. tf 
Just as a floor, however, is only a floor, 'and not 
an entire house, so also Social Security is only part of the 
pension solution, albeit a basic one. Private pension plans 
can and should build on this basic program. Some of the 
newer pension programs such as those established by Ford and 
Bethlehem are integrated with Social Security. A flat monthly 
. 
payment is made to each qualified employee upon retirement, 
and this payment includes primary Social Security benefits. 
The employer fin~~ces the differenoe between the Social Se-
12 Social Securit! and Welfare Funds, Union Hea.lth 
and Welfare Funds, NationalnaustrlaI Cohierence Board 
Studies in Business Economies" No.8, New York, 1947" 23. 
1, 
curity benefit and the flat payment due the 'WOrker. Whether 
or not this is the best method of building on the basic floor 
of Sooial Seourity is debatable. 
Regardless of how this building is done however, it 
appears that the best pension system is to have the government 
provide a pension floor and private industry should build on 
this with their own pension plans. In this way the advantages 
of the government plan can be retained vdthout turning the 
entire problem over to the government. Private industry then 
while building on this basic floor, has freedom in meeting the 
responsibility of improving their individual plans. . 
'-________ •__ .,.,.,. _____ e _______ , •• ____ ~_____ ._P __ ....,_--._ ... _,:li:lNl8jI'lU~_ 
CHAPTER III 
FINANCING THE PENSION PROGRAM 
The prLma~J purpose of a pension pl~~ is to afford 
the employee a ready inca 11e vihen he retires. There may be 
other reasons Why a plan is put into effect in a given plant 
or industry, but the essential function of a pension plan is 
to provide an adequate income to workers upon retirement. If 
a pension plan is to be a good one, it must attain this pri-
mary objeotive. If it does not fulfill this end, it is not 
a good plan, regardless of What other benefits if any, may be 
derived from it. 
It is evident, therefore that pension plans cost 
money. It is very important that both employer and employee 
realize that pensions are not magio. Someone bas to pay for 
them. Even though the company itself, an insurance oompany 
or a 'trust company, handle the funds of a pension plan, the 
cost is borne by the employer, or in the case of oontributory 
plans, by the employer and employee. 
The eost of a pension plan will in general be de-
termined by the nmnber of employees, the average age of the 
employees, the a.verage length of service, the average en-
14 
'--------------------______ u~ __ ._ 
15 
trance age, the life expectancy of the workers, the rate of 
interest, the benefits to be given, the cost of administration 
and similar factors. Figuring the cost of a pension plan is 
most important and complex. The average layman Should not 
attempt and need not try to compute this. A person skilled 
in this work should be called upon for this advice. Since the 
benefits of a pension plan affect the cost, these benefits 
must be in line with what the parties can afford, keeping in 
mind also the primary purpose of any plan. It does not seem 
wise, therefore, for a union to demand higher benefits than 
a company can afford, nor for an employer to promise greater 
benefits than he can finance. A plan Which affords very mi-
nute benefits is not \\'Orth having. A plan which promises high 
benefits and goes on the rocks, is worse than no plan at all 
because it has given a false sense of security to the workers. 
When the persons responsible for planning a pension 
program know What they are able to spend, what the cost will 
be, and what benefits are desired, it is important that they 
consider in detail and at length the method to be used in fi-
nancing this pension program. They certainly want the plan 
. 
to be able to payoff as each worker retires. They also want 
to be able to obtain the maximum in benefits for the money 
16 
they oan spend. By studying methods of finanoing they may 
find that one method is more favorable to their particular 
situation than another, or that a combination of the various 
plans is most adaptable to their company or industry • 
. 
In this chapter we will discuss the various methods 
of financing pension plans. In the following chapter we will 
go over the advantages and disadvantages of these systems. 
The cost of financing a pension plan may be handled 
on a pay-as-you-go basis or the money may be placed in a. fund 
to meet obligations. "The pay-as-you-go method is probably 
the oldest and least satisfactory. "13 
This method seems sim'Qle and inexpensive, because 
of the low initial cost. This is deoeptive however, 
because the simplicity of not taking into careful con-
sideration future costs could render a firm insolvent. 
The low initial cost hides the fact that this method 
of financing is more expensive since in this system 
there is no interest to work towards building the fund. 
Furthermore under the pay-as-lou-go method·future ob-
ligations tend to increase and these may well be at a 
·time When the oompa~ cannot withstand this inorease 
in cost. Ev~n the large~t and strongest concern~ can-
not be Cf:''rtaln that pen~non payments can be contlnued 
for generations on a pay-as-you-go basisa14 
1; J. W. Meyers, Financi~ Voluntafl Pension Plans, 
F'ol'Us"ll held on February 16, 1950, 5y fiam5er 0 Commerce, State 
of New York, 32. 
14 Business Conditions, A Review by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of cnrcago, Septem6er, 1950, 8. 
17 
Since therefore the cost is high and the oertainty of paying 
pensions as they beoome due is doubtful, this method of fi-
nancing pensions is very unsatisfactory for both employer and 
employee. 
, 
Opposed to this pay-as-you-go m~ethod is the system 
of accumulating money necessary to payoff pension benefits 
in a fund. The fund may be in an insurance company, in a 
trust or in the oompany itself providing the pension. 
Pension plans funded in an insurance oompany are 
either of the Group Annuity type, the Group Perm.a.nent In-
suranoe type or the Individual Annuity type. 1~e Group An-
nuity is 
"a type of pension plan designed by insurance 
companies for a group of personsl usual~~ employees of a single employer' .. oover?-.ng a. 1 qualifying persons 
under one contraot for the benefit of the members of 
the group. Employer contributions or employer and em-
ployee oontributions, as the case may be, are determined 
by the insurance company's aotuaries in acoordanoe with 
-the benefits to be orfered. Contributions are turned 
over to the insuranoe company as specific premiums. 
The insuranoe oompany then guarantees payment of the 
benefits as they aocpue to members of ~he group vmo 
meet the eligibility requirements. "15 
In setting up a pension prograrll, liability for the 
-
15 Handbook for Pension Planning, Bureau of National 
Affairs J 'Washington, lJ. C., 285. 
, _________ ••• _________________ ... __ ~h 
18 
future and past must be considered. The liability of the 
future, although unknown, must be forecast as aocurately as 
possible. The possibility of a business recession, or the 
seasonal nature of a particular business should be taken into 
account "16 
~ben a pension program is inaugurated, there usually 
will be a number of older employees who are olose or very 
close to the retirement age. It would not be just, nor 'WOuld 
the objective of the pension program be realized if these em-
ployees were excluded. The problem usually is solved by 
granting credit for prior se~ioe. This will of course greatly 
inorease the cost of a pension program, beoause generally, 
these older employees are earning proportionally higher wages, 
and no reserve has been set aside for them. If, by granting 
full credit for past servioe, the cost of the p~gram is ex-
cesslve, this may be reduced by giving credit for only part 
of the service in the past.17 The premium for this liability 
is oomputed as a single premium on the effeotive date of the 
16 Burton A. Zorn, Collective Bargainin&of Pen-
sions, Form held February 16, 1950 by Chamber of Commsroe, 
State of New York. 
17 Pension and Profit Sharing, Prentice-Hall, 
1948, 7011. 
19 
plan to purchase the amount of all past service credits under 
the plan.18 There is considerable flexibility in paying this 
sum, however, although the unpaid portion earns interest from 
the inception date. This payment may be made in one lump sum, 
, 
but this is usually not done because the federal incorr~ tax 
law and regulations provide that only ten per oent of the 
amount of the single sum cost may be deductible in anyone 
year in computing the employer's income taxe19 
The number of people required in writing group an-
nuities varies according to companies and according to state 
laws. Insurance companies, however, may require 50 or 100 
persons regardless of the state minimum and if. the plan is 
contributory, that 75 per cent of the eligible employees 
join the plan.20 Under the group annuity plan, the rates are 
usually guaranteed by the insurance eompany for a period of 
five ,years. At the end of this period and usually on each 
anniversary, the company reserves the right to modify the 
. t8 HandbooR for Penst0n Rlanning, Bureau of National 
Affalrs, V;ashlngton, D. ee, Ier)l, lur. 
19 Federal Income Tax Regulations, Reg. ill, Sec. 
29.23 (p) 7. ~ 
20 Handbook for Pennion Planning, Bureau of National 
Affairs, Washington, D. e., 19 9, 86. 
20 
rates either higher or lower. 
Under this type of plan the employer may receive 
credits for canoellations of annuities on termination of em-
ployment other than death. The oredit allowed on cancellation 
of any future service annuity is usually figured as follows: 
"(a) 96 per cent of the amount of the employerfs 
payments with ~nterest on each premium payment· from 
the end of the plan year in which the payment was 
made to the first of the month in which cancellation 
of the annuity occurs, less 
(b) 4 per cent of the cash value payable to 
the employee, whether or not he avails himself of 
the oash optlon. If the ~lan provides for the re-
turn to the employee of hlS oontribution without 
interest and the employee terminates at least three 
leal'S after he entered the ilan, this 4 per oent 
deduotion will not be made. 21 
As regards the credit to the employer on any past 
service annuity, it will either be "96 per oent of the em-
ployer's premiu~ payments for such past service annuity with 
interest from the date of payment to the first of the month 
of cancellation or 100 per cent of the employer's premiums 
"th t' t t« W1 ou 1n eres • 22 
For that portion which is vested in the employee 
21 Ibid, 104-105. 
22 Ibid, 105. 
~--------------------.--------,-.----------------------,-------
,-------------.-.-.--~-.---------------..... ------.......... ----------..... ~ 
21 
there will of course be no oancellation and therefore no cre-
dite2; 
If an employee continues to work after the set re-
tirement age often the benefits which lmuld be due hirn. at re-
tirement are postponed until he actually does retire. The 
payments which would have been made during this period are 
credited to the employer against future premiumsa24 
Rate credits or rate reductions may also accrue to 
the employer depending upon the size and experience of his 
particular contraot and the insurance oompany's general ex-
perience on group annuities. Investment yields on the ac-
oumulated cash balance in the oontraot may also result in a 
dividend to the employer.25 
It must be kept in mind, however, that in order to 
qualify for the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, 
. 
credits due the employer, may not be ~aid in cash, but are to 
. -
apply to future premiums.26 The employees covered under the 
plan will receive oredit upon termination of employment. The 
2; Ibid, 10;. 
24 Ibid, 97. 
Ibid, Ill. 
Federal Income Tax Re Reg. Ill, Seo • 
• 
__________________ ""l1~_. 
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employee is generally given the option of continuing the an-
nuity, purchased with his own contributions, or withdrawing 
his contributions in cash with or without interest, depending 
upon the contract. Under a contributory plan, in the event 
, 
the employee dies before retirement, his contributions are 
payable to his beneficiary or estate. 
A type of group annuity sometimes used in funding 
a pension plan is knovm as deposit administration. It is gen-
erally used only where there are large groups (at least 500 
to 1,000 persons) to be covered. There are some insurance 
companies, however, who prefer not to write this type of plan. 
27 As Boyoe desoribes the plan; 
Under this deposit administration arrangement 
the premiums Which the employer pays are not used to 
p. uronase paid up deferred annuitles, but rather are 
kept in a single fund. If employees oontribute, 
their premiums are kept in a separate deposit fund. 
As each worker retires the amount necessary to pur-
chase the partioular employee's annuity is withdrawn 
· from the fund. The rate paid for the annuity is the 
same as the rate paid under the group annuity plan; 
maximum and minimum deposits are agreed upon. 
The insurance company guarantees the minimum rate of interest 
on the deposit; it does not guarantee any speoific amount of 
benefit payable on retirement. Once an annuity is'purohased, 
27 How to Plan Pensions, MoGraw-Hill, New York, 
1950, 1;6-137. 
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however, the insurance company does guarantee payment for life. 
Since annuities are not bought bef~re retirement there is no 
employer credit for withdrawals_ 2k These however may be es-l/ 
timated and. discounted in advance. 
A oombination of life insuranoe and retirement bene-
fits is found in the Group Permanent Plan underwritten by in-
surance companies. Group permanent insurance, as related to 
pensions is a retirement plan which usually combines life in-
surance wi th retire~n.ent benefits and uses the level premium 
method, under a group contract between the employer and the 
insurance companY-29 Since the coverage is broader and the 
administration more complex than the group annuity plan, the 
premi~~s are higher. This form of coverage usually provides 
$1,000 of life insurance with each unit of $10.00 of monthly 
retirement income. The insurance coverage up to certain 
limits I apply automatically to each member of the group with-
• 
out medical examination. 
For small companies witt.. few employees, insurance 
companies will write individual annuities to provide a pension • 
Affairs, 
28 Handbook for Fenaion Planning, 
Washington, D. C., 19 9, 115. 
29 Ibid, 285. 
. 
Bureau of National 
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An individual annuity is a contract with an insurance company 
under which the insurance company guarantees to pay an in-
dividual employee a certain amount of money per month or per 
year starting at a certain age, such as 65, for as long as he 
. 
lives.30 The contracts are written in the na~e of the in-
dividual worker and premiQms are on a level annual basis. 
Most annuities provide for benefits in units of ten dollars. 
Often life insurance is written in conjunction with the in-
dividual a~nuity, usually 1,000 dollars for each 10 dollars 
monthly retirement benefit. Medical examinations are gener-
ally required. If an employee is unable to pasJ the physical 
examination an annuity is issued without the life insurance. 
Under this method of providing pensions, withdrawals 
. 
are quite expensive for the employer because particularly in 
the early years the cash value is usually 10w.3~ Boyce points 
out that 
quite often a t~~st is establiahed to handle these 
indivldual annuities. This is to prevent members of the 
plan from gaining control of the policies. It is possi-
ble that if the employees were given the contracts, the 
employer might be open to claims fo r overtime under the 
Wage and Hour Law, since the payments made to the in-
30 Carroll Boyce, How To Plan Pensions, McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 1950, 473. 
,1 Ibid, 139. 
I 
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surance company would have the effect of putting L~­
mediate casn in the hands of the employee. Then 
pension contributions would have to be computed in 
overtime paY' 32 
Pension plans may also be funded through a trust 
agreement. 
A Pension Trust Fund is a fund consisting of 
money contributed by the employer and in some cases 
the employer and employee, to provide pension bene-
fits. Contributions are paid to a trustee, either 
corporate or individual, "ho invests the money, col-
lects the interest and earnings and disburses the 
benefits under the terms of the plan and trust ag~oe­
~ent. A pension trust fund r~y Le either wholly self-
administered or the plan may be partially insured with 
benefits purchased by the trustee, often at retirement, 
from an insurance company.,3 
Sometimes this plan is called uself adm.inistered" or "self 
insured." 
The usual prQoedure in setting up a trust plan is 
that the employer or the pension committee selects a trustee. 
This may be an individual, a corporation, a trust company or 
a bs.nk. The trustee is then put in charge of the fund and 
the responsibilities of the employer and trustee are set forth 
as regards the ad~inistration of the trust funds. There may 
or may not be specific rules as to amounts and time of deposits 
32 Ibid, 139. 
~)3 .Handbook for Pension P~anning, Bureau of National 
Affairs, ~~ashlngton, D. C., 19'49, 287. 
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or as to investments. The trustee is authorized to make pay-
ments from the fund to employees and retired employees accord-
ing to the conditions specified in the plan. It is important 
to remember, that under this type of. plan it is the responsibi-
lity of the parties to see that the plan is actuarially sound. 
Employees may contribute under a trust plan. Death benefits 
or even disability pensions can be provided under a tMlst agree-
ment, dependine upon the amount the employer or the employer 
and employees are Vidlling to spend. 
The Ordinary Life Pension Trust is a combination of 
life insurance with a self-administered trusteed plan'. The 
trustee l'Plrch8.ses ordinary life insurance fo reach anployee or 
for all employees, and pays the premiums on this insurance 
until the employee reaches retirement a:~e. The trust also ac-
cumulates in an auxiliary fund, surns to purchase retirement 
benefits for the employee. The paid up cash vaiue of the in-
• Sllrance policy is then used to help purchase an a.nnuity for 
the employee. 
It is apparent that there are many ways in which a 
pension plan can be financed.. Each plan has strong points and 
. 
wea.k points, advantages and disadvalltaees. Since it js very 
important to both employer and employee that their plan be 
sound, let us analyze the advantages and disadvantages of 
27 
each plan. 
CHAPTER IV 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
In discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
financing pensions, it is well, to keep in mind that it is not 
possible to compare one system against another for the purpose 
of finding the best method. The different financing methods 
do not oompete one against the other, but are available for 
seleotion to fit the definite occasion and need. A plan that 
works very well in one plant or industry may be no good at all 
in another industry. For example s~all plants may prefer to 
finance their pension through an insuranoe company by individ-
ual annuities. A larger concern may finanee through an in-
surance company, but use group annuities. A large industry may 
select to finance their plan in a trust fund. 'fTihat's one 
man's meat is another man's poison" applies alsG to methods of 
financing a pension. It is often possible that a combination 
of plans will provide the best answer to a specific situation. 
It is well for employel' and employees to realize this point. 
They should want to get the broadest, soundest pension benefits 
at the lowest cost. They will be wise, therefore, -if they de-
liberate long and carefully to see what plan or combination of 
28 
r 
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plans will do this fo r them. 
As tllJe pointed out pl"eviously, it is hard to conceive 
of any instance v.:here it would be ::no1'e advantageous to finance 
a pension by an unfunded m.ethod. An unfunded system of financ-
. 
ing is usually n10re costly in the long run, and never has the 
securi ty of a funded syste1n. Vc~e shall not, the refore, compare 
or analyze pension plans that are financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. 
The question to be d_ecidet1 by the employer or the 
union is 'whether the pension should be financed through an in-
suranoe company or v.nether it should be handled by a self-in-
sured trust. If the pens ion is to be ha.ndled by an insurance 
company they must further deoide on the type of contract or 
contracts to be used. The parties must also determine whether 
a co~bination of these plans ~uuld best suit their needs. 
Let us oonsider some of the factors which will in-
fluence the decision. The size of personnel will definitely 
determine the plan to be-used in financing the pension.vi;'here 
there are less than 100 or 200 employees it is better to fi-
nance through an insured plan, rather than by a self-insured 
trust. Self-insurance even if the entire 100 or 200 employees 
were participants must be excluded; only in an exceptional 
t-______________ -_______________ , ___ ... ~_, 
,0 
situation would an employer of 200 or less be warranted in 
assuming the risks and expense of self-insurance.,4 If an 
insured plan is selected, the number of employees will in 
part determ~ne the type of plan available. Most companies re-
quire a minimum of 50 to 100 eligible employees to qualify for 
a group annuity plan. If the employer cannot qualify for a 
group annuity plan because of the size of his working force, 
individual annuity contracts is the only type of plan he can 
use to fund the pension program. 
In the situation where there are more than 200 em-
ployees to be covered under a pension plan, there is much 
more variety as to how the plan may be financed. The plan 
may be insured or a self-insured trust used. If the plan is 
insured, either the group annuity, deposit administration or 
group permanent type may be used. 
If, therefore, the personnel size per.mits a wide 
selection of plans, the parties will undoubtedly want to in-
stall that plan or combination of plans which will give them 
the broadest, most secure benefits at the cheapest cost. The 
financial strength and reserves of the company or industv,y 
. 
must be determined and projected as far as possible into the 
34 Hugh O'Ne!ll, Modern Pension Plans, Prentice-
Hall, New York, 1947, 246. 
future., 
known. 
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How muoh the oompany oan spend on pensions must be 
It should be deoided whether the pension will be on 
a oontributory or non-oontributory basis. ~ben it is known 
how much oan be spent, the parties can begin to look for the 
best plan or combination that 'will fit their partioular need. 
It must be kept in mind at all times that regardless of the 
method of funding used, the oost of a pension plan will be 
the expense of the payment of benefits plus the cost of ad-
ministration minus the interest accrued. 
Practioally the same benefits may be obtained under 
the trust method as under the insured method. It is rather 
fruitless to oompare the various types of plans, such as Group 
Annuities, Group Permanent Insuranoe or Individual Annuities 
with one another as regards benefits. The amount of retire-
ment benefit, of course, will depend upon how much the em-
ployer or employer and employees are willing to spend. If 
• 
death benefits are to be included as is usual in Group Per-
manent or Individual Annuities, this is naturally going to 
oost more than a plan excluding this benefit. It is well for 
the parties to study the various plans or oombination of plans 
. 
to see which one will be most advantageous to them as regards 
benefits for the money they can afford to spend. 
The oost of administration is a factor whioh will 
32 
determine the method of funding. lfure again the size of the 
working force must be oonsidered. ={lost small employers do not 
have the skilled personnel nor the facilities to effectively 
self-administer a plan. For them a pension plan can best be 
. 
handled by an insurance company which will administer the plan. 
For larger companies who have a choice of either a trust plan 
or an insurance plan, a self-administered trust plan will often 
be cheaper as regards administration costs. It is claimed that 
the trustee's expense, other than basic fees and custodial ex-
penseo (whioh correspond to the investment expenses of in-
surance oompanies) will usually be less than 1% of contribu-
tions. The expense loading under group annuity insurance con-
tracts is 8%, the major portion of which is for items other 
, 36 than actual expenses. 35 It must be noted, as Boyce points 
out that the aotual loading for administration is usually 3 
to 4 per cent and the remainder of the 8 per oent is for con-
• 
tingencies. Since the insuranoe oompany guarantees a certain 
rate of interest on its 'policies, it must set aside a reserve 
35 J. W. Meyers, It'inanoing Voluntaty Pension Plans 
Forum held on February 16, 1950, Chamber or Commerce, State ot 
New York, 35. 
36 How To Plan Pensions, }:ioGraw-Hill, New York, 
1950, 198. 
to take care of investment losses. 
The commissions paid to brokers or agents in insured 
individual policy plans usually run about three or three and 
one-half pe-r cent of the annual premimn. This cost is avoided 
. 
in a self-insured plan, although, unless a company has skilled 
technicians available, there will be expenses for pension con-
sultants, actuaries and trustees_'7 These costs, however, are 
included in the ; to 4 per cent administration charges under 
insured pla.ns. 
The quality of the administration process must be 
considered, of course, and the parties must determine Whether 
in their particular case the cost of administration would be 
less by self-insurance than by the insured plan. 
The actuarial principles used in determining the 
liabilities of a pension plan are exactly the same whether the 
plan is insured or self-insured. One exception, however, is 
• 
that a.n independent actuary will generally use more realistic 
mortality rates than tho'se often used by insurance companies. 
Because of the different tables used, the total cost of the 
self-insured plan will be less, and in some instances as much 
37 N'. H. Seefurth, A Second Look at Pension and Pro-fit Sharing Plans, Financial N~Wm~a~g-em~e~n~t~S~e~r~i-e-s~NPo~/.~~1~·~~'~;~X~~e~r~i~-~ 
can Management Association, 1947, 31. ~> 
v 
,4 
as 15 per cent.,S 
The interest that the fund accumulates is of im-
portance to those planning a pension as this affeots the oost. 
The rates of interest on investments have fallen considerably 
during the past fifteen years; 
In 1927 or 1928 an aotuary, in computing a self-
insured plan, might have conservatively used an in-
terest rate of four to five per cent. Toda~, however, 
about two and. one-half per cent is all he mlght reason-
ably assume. An actuary figurinfJ.' an insured plan 
would be even more conservative beoause he is setting 
a prioe for a guaranteed produot.,9 
In this respect it is generally agreed that insuranoe companies 
have a wider field or a more diversified investment portfolio 
than the trustee handling the self-insured fund. Sinoe in-
terest on. the fund represents a savings, and sometimes a sub-
stantial one, it is we!l for the parties to oheok this oare-
fully. 
An important faotor, in determining the plan to be 
used, especially in a company where the earnings are not oon-
stant is the freedom allowed as to time and amount of payment 
,8 "Emnloyee Retirement Plans," Round Table Dis-
oussion, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company 
of Chlcago, Trust Department, 1950, 65. 
39 Harry E. ~lagden "Actuarial Basis for Pension 
Systems," Pensions and Profit ~haring Trusts, New York Univer-
sity, 1944, 6'7. 
,5 
into the fund. The self-insured trust allows more flexibility 
in this regard than does the insurance method. The insurance 
companies, however, under the deposit a&ninistration plan have 
attempted to meet tbis challenge. 
Since there is no su'rrender charge fo r withdrawals 
under the self-insured trust plan, whereas there is a penalty 
under practically all insured plans, this important feature 
must be taken into' consideration before deciding hov~ the pen-
sion plan is to be funded. 
The attitude of the union in bargained pension plans 
will have an effect upon the method of fmlding. Some unions 
will insist upon an insured plan fully funded. Other union8 
will leave the matter of funding up to management. There is 
a tendency recently, especially among the larger unions to ae-
mand jointly administered self-insured plans. 
There is no special rule to follow on" the system to 
be used in funding a pension plan. Irdividual circumstances 
will determine the best system to be used. The main feature 
of self-insured trust funds is flexibility. The outstanding 
characteristic of insured plans is security. There are, hoV!:-
ever, advantages and disadvantages to both. What aspect each 
plan will take 'should be based upon the individual case. It 
is often advantageous to use a combination of various systems 
;6 
and. pla.ns. The goal is to obta.in for the lowest cost, the 
most secure pension plan that ,all give the best benefits. 
CHAPTER V 
PENSION PROBLEMS 
The problems of financing and funding are not the 
only problems to be solved in s~tting up a pension plan. 1~ere 
are many other questions which must be answered if a plan is to 
function efficiently. Since a pension plan will have serious 
and long-range effects upon the employer, the employee and the 
public, one cannot urge too strongly that unions and manage-
ment seek not only their own selfish interests, but the good 
of all in working out these problems, Because pension,S in-
volve grave long-term commitments, it is to be hoped that the 
plans be studied thoroughly and patiently by both sides to-
gether. 
(I) Pensions Within the Proper Scope of Collective 
Bargaining 
There is no doubt now that pensions are wi thin the 
proper scope of collective bargaining. This l\ras decided in 
the Inland Steel Case. 
The Inland Steel Compal?-¥" installed a pension plan 
on January 1 1936. The retlrement age was set at 65 
and sectio:1 three stated, "no employee shall be retained 
in active service after the normal retirement ,date, ex-
cept upon year to year approval of the Board. t During 
37 
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the war years this approval ~as given almost auto-
matically in order to keep a necessary large working 
force. Atter the war however .. this normal retirement 
age began to take on some meaning again. The ~ompany 
returned to the old practice of compulso~y retlrement 
at the age of 65 without consulting the union.40 
When the union complained about this the company refused to 
discuss the matter. The C.I.O. Steelworkers Union then 
charged the Inland Steel Company with an unfair labor practice 
before the N.L.R.B. The basis of the Steelworkers' charge was 
that compulsory retirement was a condition of employment and 
thus subject to collective bargaining. In April 1948 .. the 
Board ruled in favor of the C.I.O. Steelworkers by a,4 to 1 
decision. The National Labol' Relations Board ordered the In-
land Steel Company to 
"Cease and de.slst from 
If(!) Refusing to pargain collectively with Local 
Unions Hos. 1010 and 64, United Steelworkers of America (CIO) with respect to its pension and retirement poli-
cies if and when said labor organization shall have 
• complied wi thin thirty (30) day~ from the date of the 
Order" vJith Section (9) (f), (eJ and (h) of the Act 
as amended~ as the exclusive bar~inlng representative 
of all proauction, maintenance and transportation 
workers in the (petitioner's) Indiana Harbor, Indiana 
and Chicago Heights, Illinois 'olants, exclua~ng fore-
men assistant foremen, supervisory, offioe and salaried 
empioyees; brickl.ayers, timekeepers, teclulica.l engineers, 
110 Carroll W. Boyce, How to Pla.n Pensions, 2~lcGraw­
Hill, New 1ork, 1950, 5. 
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technioians, draftmnen, chemists, watchmen and nurses; 
U(B) Making atl.:y- unilateral changes, affecting any 
employees in the unlt represented by the union, wlth 
respeot to its pension" and retirs1nent policies1 without prior oonsultatlon witn the Union, when and if ~he Union 
shall have oomplied with the filing re~uirements of the 
Act, as amendeij, in the ~ner set forth above."J+l 
The Board found that the company refused to discuss the ori-
ginal pension plan and amena~ents with the union and since 
this involved wages and working conditions, the company by 
their refusal to bargain was guilty of an unfair labor prac-
tioe. 
The Board ruled that "wages include emoluments of 
value like pension and insuranoe benefits whioh may aocrue to 
employees out of their employment relationship." Pensions, 
they held, are part of ,wages and thus, subject to colleotive 
bargaining. Compulsory retirement comes within oonditions of 
employment, the Board ruled and therefore, this· too was sub-
jeot to bargaining. The Board relied on previous court de-
cisions, and partioularly upon the legislative history of the 
N.L.R.A. as amended to substantiate their ruling. The Board's 
deoision was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals at Chlcago and the United States Supreme Court denied 
41 22 LRRM 2508 
certiorari·42 
From this case, it is therefore evident that pensions 
do fall within the proper scope of colleotive bargaining. 
(2) CQntributory or Non-Contributory 
The question whether 'or not employees should contri-
bute toward the pension plan is often a headache in setting up 
a plan. This problem has been argued pro and con at length 
and in detail. Some of the disagreements have not been plea-
sant. One of the main issues in the steel strike of 1949 was 
that of employee oontributions. 
A contributory pension plan is one in which'the par-
tioipants pay part of the cost of purchasing the annuity or 
building up the fund from whioh pensions are paid. 43 A non-
oontributory plan is one in which the employer pays the entire 
cost of the premiums or of building up a fund from which pen-
sion~ are paid.44 
It is evident that if an employee contributes to a 
pension plan, larger benefits may be purchased for him. If the 
h2 Inland Steel Company v N.t.R.B. 170F2d247; cert. 
denied 336u~S.960. . 
Affairs, 
,43 .BAndbook for Penllion Planning, 
vi:ashlngton, D. C., 19 9, 28S. 
44 Ibid, 287. 
Bureau of National 
employees a.dd so'"nething to the amount that the employer pays 
into the fund there will be a greater sum available for them 
to purchase benefits. Boyce45 points out, however, this does 
not follow through on a dollar for dollar basis. Because em-
, 
ployees have normally the right to have their own contributions 
refunded if they become separated from emploJrment prior to re-
tirement, so~e of their monpy will be used to pay death bene-
fits, in the case of those who die before retiring and some 
will be returned to those Who te~inate employment before re-
tiring. Also while retirement income, up to the amount of the 
employee's contribution is tax free'46 the amount he contri-
butes is not. The employer's contribution, however, is us-
ually exempt. 47 
There is the rebuttal, however, that if the employee's 
contribution is reasonable, it will not contribute much to the 
ove~all pension cost. The added cost of administration which 
accompanies a contributory plan is not worth the relatively 
small total of employee contributions. It is also contended 
115 Carroll W. Boyce, How To Plan Pensions, McGraw-
Hill, New York, 1950, 75. 
46 Internal Revenue Code, See. 22(b)(2) 
47 Ibid, See. 23(p)(I)(A) 
that another payroll deduction (in this case for Pensions) 
would tend to make the employees more 'mge conscious, since 
their take home pay would be less. This might easily lead to 
a demand fo.r a vJage increase, which" in the long run, could 
. 
mean that the employer is paying the total cost of the pension 
plan. 
Those advocating the contributory plan point out 
that when an employee contributes toward the pension, he is 
shouldering part of the responsibility of providing security 
for his old age and is more aware of the cost of the plan. 
The persons favoring a non-contributory plan, however, hold 
that it is the obligation of management to provide the best 
benefits they can afford, and after that it is the employee's 
. 
own business if and how he wants to provide further for his 
years of retirement. 
In theory it seems that in a contributory plan a 
worker would be in a much better position to demand a voice 
in the pension administration. In practice this has not al-
ways held true, because unions have demanded and received a 
part in administration of pensions that are on a non-contri-
butory basis. 
Employees in a contributory plan often have a vested 
43 
right to the benefits accrued prior to their separation from 
service. This is important to the employee, and is hailed as 
a good point for the adherents of the contributory plan. The 
opponents of. this plan, while recognizing the employee's right, 
maintain that vesting is not a1ways favorable to the employer, 
because it reduces the effectiveness of a pension plan in cut-
ting down employee turnover.48 
Since the' Treasury insists that at least 7C per cent 
of all the employees or 80 per cent of the eligible employees 
partioipate in a pension plan in order to qualify for tax ex-
emption'49 those favoring a non-contributory plan point out 
that the employer runs a risk of not qualifying if the required 
number do not sign up, unless the plan is compulsory. 
The problem of contributions recently has been placed 
on an optional basis in some pension plans. In these cases 
if the plan is contributory the employee may elect to contri-
bute an additional amount, or if the plan is non.contributory 
he may contribute to the cost. In return for this contribution 
he reoeives a stated additional amount of benefit· 50 
Reserve 
4B "Business Conditions," A Review of tlie Federal 
Bank of, Chicago, September, I950, '/. 
49 Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 165{a)(3) 
Boyce, How To Plan Pensions, McGraw-Hill, 
4ll 
It is evident that the question of oontributo~ or 
non-oontributory plan has arguments for and against each. The 
practioal answer usually will be given in aocordance with the 
specific company, the economic conditions 8.L'1d the specific 
issues at hand. From the theoretical standpoint it would seem 
that if the basic objeotive of pensions is to provide eoonomio 
security for workers in old age, this could best be aohieved 
in most instanoes by having a contributor.1 plan because there 
would be more money available to purohase benefits, and b~l 
oomparison therefore, the benefits should be greater either by 
quality or quantity_ 
<.~;) Vesting 
The question of vesting is another problem that must 
, 
be answered in setting up a pension plan. Vesting means that 
an employee oovered under the plan who leaves the company for 
any reason not exoepted by the plan, does not lose all of the 
• 
equity built up on his behalf, but may, at a designated time, 
receive either a stated lump sum payment or a reduced pro rata 
pension prior to the time he reaches retirement age or a normal 
pension upon the attainment of normal retirement a~e.51 
51 Handbook for Penst0n Planning, Bureau of National 
Affairs, washington, D. C., I9 9, 289. 
h5 
In a contributory plan, of course, the e"J1ployee has 
a vested riGht to the amount of his contributiol1, and when he 
terminates employment this amount is returned to him usually 
with interest. If a plan is funded. in such a way that there 
is a surrender charge for withdrawals, sometimes, part or all 
of this interest is withheld to offset this. 
In non-contributory plans the time of vesting and 
the amount vested_may depend upon age, service, comb~nation of 
both, membership in plan and reason for retirement. Vesting 
may be im:rnediate or deferred. The employee's vested right may 
be returned to him in a lUillp sum cash payment, 0 r by' purchas-
ing a retirement income for the employee with this amount. If 
a plan is fund.ed by individual annuities, the employee may be 
, 
given the option of taking over the annuity. 
It is apparent that if a plan has liberal vesting 
provisions, it is going to be costly. Vesting, however, can 
• 
be used to good advantage by giving the employees a feeling 
of security and by giving them some job mobility. The economic 
shock of a lou!]; layoff may be tempered somewhat by an em-
ployee's vested right in a plan. Death benefits may be a sub-
. ject of vesting, although this is more common under plans 
which use individual annuity contracts. Under other plans 
this may be taken care of by group life insurance. 
In settinG up a pension plan care should be taken to 
seek the proper ~oint at which the advantaees of vestinG can be 
had without sacrificing the main objective, i.e. adequate re-
tirement benefits. This will call for a thorough study of the 
requirements to be met for an e'mplo;yee to be eligible for 
vesting. 
(4) Administration 
Whether the pension should be administered by the e~­
player only or whether it should be administered jointly by 
the employer and the union is usually a thorny question w!:lich 
must be solved. This problem refleots one of the basic dif-
ferences between labor and management, namely, should labor 
have a voice in manageillent and if so how much. Since pension 
plans are designed prirnarly for the employee .. and since the 
worker has so much at stake in a pension plan, it is difficult 
to see why the lUlion should not join management "in the adminis-
tration of the plan. If the plan is contributory, the argu-
ment of the union for joint administration is even more evident. 
, In the report, "Retirement Funds for Newspaper 
Workers,· prepared by Murray Latimer'52 Seotion 11 states, 
52 :hi:;r'ay W. Latimer'T "Retj.rement Funds for News-
paper Workers, n :::>ec. 11, How To Plan Pensions, Carroll W. 
Boyce, 201+. 
, 
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"In tlJ.es :[>ast most ocnsiOll plans have been ad:n.in-
istered on a un~lateral basis, with such help from in-
surance compan.ies., actuaries and other exoorts as the 
employer, in his discretion might retain. L Participation 
by representative of labor orgl:lJlizativns in the ac1irrinis-
tration of pension plans is h~ghly desirable for several 
reasons. FJ.rst and foremost, of coux"se is that partici-
pation is desirable in order to make sure that the in-
terests of th.e participants are protected. Secondl the e;perience gained by union representatives in know edge 
of the functioning of ~ension plans is valuable. Third, 
participation in adminlstration gives union representa-
tives a leverage in making sure that the development 
of the plan is towards more effective proteotion of em-
ploJees~ against the hazards of old ag3 -and dlsa·oility. 
The tas!:s of an administrat ive body nave to do with 
the a·ward of pensions, which may involve determination 
of disability; with deoisions as to how to make the 
pal~ents in order to protect the interests of those 
elaerly or disabled persons whose mentalitl mal have 
been clouded; with maintaining records useful for the 
purpose of studying experience, with seeinr:; to it that 
ade~uate contribut~on rates are 'naintained; with making 
declsions with respeot to investments or w~th respect 
to select~on of outsi~e a~encies for ~hat purpose; with 
recommend~ng ohanges In pLa.n terms; ~th whatever steps 
are needed to make the plan function effectively. In; 
all these aspeots of administration, the union has as . 
much, frequently more, to contribute as management." . 
Even though many of the newly bargained pension plans 
provide for joint administration of the plan, management seems 
to fear the position that unions thus assume. The unions on 
the other hand, are unwilling to let management a&ninister the 
entire pension program, since it is so important to the wo rkers • 
It is to be hoped that as the two v~rk together these fears . ,. 
and doubts will disappear. 
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It would seem wise to state very definitely just 
what administrative power a joint committee will wield; just 
how far either management or the union can go. This will 
help proteot the pension plan and ultimately the workers in 
, 
case either side should attempt to pursue their own selfish 
interests. 
We shall not attempt to enumerate all the pension 
problems that may arise. It is certain that difficult ques-
tions and serious problems will crop up in setting up a pen-
sion plan. It is very important that both unions and manage-
ment always keep in mind the basic objective of the pension 
plan and try to work out these problema harmoniously. 
CHAPTER VI 
LEGAL and TAX ASPECTS OF PENSImm 
It is ver,y important that a pension plan meets all 
legal and tax qualific~tions 4t all times. Much time, trouble 
and money can be saved if the advice of a qualified person or 
persons is obtained regarding these aspects. If a firm, large 
or small, does not have the qualified personnel, it is impera-
tive to call in some experts who could advise them. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to attempt to 
detail all the legal and tax pitfalls inherent in pension pro-
grams, nor to try to give the solutions to problems in this 
area. We wish to point out that there are important problems, 
as regards legality and taxation, Which must and can be solved, 
and we will review some of these. 
There is no definite field of law which deals only 
with pensions. Actually pensions oris-cross into many fields 
and regulations as regards legality, such as tax laws, labor 
laws, wage and hour legislation, S.E.C. regulations and many 
others. Unfortunately there is no model to follow, but eaoh 
plan must be carefully checked to be sure that it 1s on safe 
49 
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legal ground; otherwise serious trouble will follow. 
The employer will certainly want to be sure that the 
pension plan qualifies for tax exemption under the Internal 
Revenue Code. If the plan qualifies, much money can be saved, 
and therefore greater benefits'may be purchased. 
The provisions of law ~ontrol1ing tax exemption 
are found in Section 165 (a) and those concerning de-
duction in Seotion 23 (p) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The law has been combined in Re~lations of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue. In addition to this 
there have been a whole series of rulings known as 
P.S. Rulings issued through the Pension Trust Division 
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Washington, D. C., 
and miscellaneous Bulletins, General Counsel Memoranda, 
Treasury Decisions, Mimeographs, and. the like-53 
The principal requirerllents to qualify a plan under 
Section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code are: 
1) The plan must be pern~nent. 
2) There must be a trust, contract or other 
legally binding instrument. 
3) It must be for the exclusive benefit of 
the employees or their beneficiaries. 
4) Until the purposes of the plan have been 
fulfilled, it must be impossible for the 
principal or income of the trust t6 be 
53 Gustave Simons "Qualifying a Plan," Handbook for 
oPlanning, Bureau of hatlonal lffairs, Washington, D. C., 
1 
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diverted from these benefits to any other 
souroe. 
5) The trust must include certain minimum per-
sonnel. It oannot be for selected groups 
of executives or supervisors. 
6) The benefits speoified must not disoriminate 
in favor of offioers, stookholders, super-
visory personnel or highly paid employees. 
Sinoe there are oertain definite data Whioh must be 
supplied to the Internal Revenue Office, the pension plan 
should be worked out in detail and then the neoessary infor-
mation sent to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for an ad-
vanced ruling. If the plan is not approved, the plan must be 
amended until it meets the qualifioations. When the plan is 
approved, a letter will be sent to the taxpayer over the signa-
. 
ture of the Commissioner, stating that the plan meets the re-
quirements of Seotion 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
provided the information given was oorreot and true. 
The qualifying rules, partioularly the ones oonoern-
ing non-disorimination may give doubt as to interpretation in 
. 
partioular oases. It is well to study the rulings of the Com-
mission in regard to all these qualifying rules. In the final 
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event, however, the Commission will judge as to whether or not 
a partioular plan qualifies or not. 
Although a pension plan qualifies for tax exemption 
under Section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, actual ex-
emptions, year to year, howeve~, must be claimed under Section 
23 (p). If a plan qualifies for tax exemption under Seotion 
165 (a) the Bureau places oertain limitations in the quantity 
of payments that may be deducted in anyone year under Seotion 
2; (p). It is also important to oheck State tax laws, as these 
laws vary accordine to State, as to whether the pension trust 
itself, the income, from the trust, the employer's contributions, 
the employee's contributions, or the pension benefits are sub-
ject to taxation.54 
It is very important, therefore, to all parties con-
cerned, that a pension plan be set up in suoh a manner that it 
will qualify for tax exemption • 
• 
The Fair Labor Standards Aot must be taken into ac-
count when planning pensions. Under this Act, a worker who is 
covered, is entitled to overtime premium when he works more 
than forty hours in one work-week. In figuring the overtime 
54 Blue5rint~n§ the Pension Plan, Commerce Clearing 
House, Chicago, 19 0, 5 - 7. 
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premium. the question arises as to \"1hether the employer's con-
tribution to a pension plan constitutes part of the employees' 
earnings, so as to be included in the employees' regular rate 
of pay. Prior to the amen<1llent of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in 191t9, there was nothing'definite on this, although there 
were a series of rulings by the Wage-IIour Administrator. This 
question, however, has been answered in the Amendments of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, effective January 25, 1950. Begin-
ning on that date, an employer's contribution to a pension plan 
is not included in the figuring of his employee' s ttregular rate 
of pay, tt provided that the employer's contributions: oannot 
be recovered by him~ that is, irrevocable; that they are made 
to a trustee or third person; and that they are made in accor-
. 
dance with a bona fide plan. 55 
In cases where the pension plan does not apply to 
workers covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is wise 
. 
to check State laws as regards minimum wages, wage payment and 
wage assignment. 
Labor law must be complied with in setting up a 
pension plan. As we have previously seen, it has been legally 
established that pensions come within the soope of collective 
55 Ibid, 35. 
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bargaining. 
The Taft-Hartley Act has definite provisions concern-
ing employerfq contributions and administration of pensions and 
applies to all who come under the Act. Section 302 (c) states: 
"The proVt· sions of this section shall not be appli-
cable • • • (5 with respect to mone¥ or other things 
of value paid to a trust fund establlshed b~ such rep-
resentative for the sole and exclusive benefits of the 
employees of such employer, and their families and de-
Eendents (or of suoh employees, fmailies and dependents 
Jointly with the employees of other employers making 
similar pa~entst and their f&~ilies and dependents): 
provided, that (A) such payments are held .in trust for 
the purpose ofpayinrr, elther from the principal or in-
come or both for the benefit of employees, their 
fami1ies and Aependents, for Iuedical or hospital care, 
pensions on retlrement or death of employees, compen-
sation for injuries or illness resultlng from occupa-
tional a ctivity or insurance to provide any of the 
foregoing, or unemployment beneflts or life insurance, 
di~aDility and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such parents are to be 
made is specified 'in a written agreemen with the em-
ployer, and emplofees and employers are equally repre-
sented in the admlnistration of such fund together 
with such neutral persons as the represen{~tives of the 
employers and representatives of the employees may 
. agree upon and in the event the employe r and employee 
groups aeadlock on the administratlon of such fund and 
there are no neutral persons empowered to break such a 
deadlock, such agreement provides that the two grou~s 
shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dlS-
putes, or in event of their fallure to agree wi thin a 
reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to de-
cide such dispute shall on petition of either group 
be appointed by the district 'court of the United States 
for tEe district Where the trust fund has its principal 
office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual 
audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of 
which shall be available for inspection by interested 
j 
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persons at the prinoipal office of the trust fund &nd 
at such other plaoes as may be designated in such 
written aKreement; and (C) suoh pa~ents are are in-
tended to-be used for the purpose of providing pensions 
or annui'i.;ies for employees are made to a separate trust 
which provides that the funds held therein cannot be 
used for any ~urpose other than paying such pensions 
or annuities. 56 ' 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the Ta.ft-
Hartley Act provides definite limita~ions as regards certain 
pension trust funds, particularly as to who is to benefit, 
the use of the fund, the adminietration of the fund and an 
a.ccounting of the fund. 
Other Federal and State Labor Laws must be,studied 
as regards the pension plan, particularly ~nen the plan is 
tied in with oollective bargaining. Laws pertaining to union 
security, bargaining rights, and bargaining praotices oan 
have an effect on pension plans. For instance, a pension plan 
would be in jeopardy in many states if it were -included jn a 
bargaining aGree~ent Which provides anion security through the 
union shop, as the union shop is outlawed in many states. 57 
It is also wise to determine if the pension plan 
checks favorably with S.E.C. regulations. 
56 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 19)a, 
Sec. 302 (c). 
House 
the Pension Plan, Cownerce Clearing 
i 
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tions are highly technical and must be carefully checken es-
pecially with contributory plans. The reason for this is 
that the inveotment contract or certificate of interest in 
contributory plans involves sales as far as Section 2 (3) of 
the Seourities Act of 1933 is concerned-58 
The exceptions to rule 430 are important because 
ordinarily a contributory voluntary plan will be ex-
empt, if it comes under anyone of the following four 
exemptions: 
(1) Contributions are used only to buy annuity 
contraots or insurance policies - both of which are 
themselves exempt from registration. 
(2) Plan membership is liT1ited to those who 
live in the state in which the em:t>loyer is a resi-
dent or is incorporated and is dOlng business. 
(;) }lembership in the plan is offered pri-
vately to a limited number of employees. . 
(4) If the amount of contribution to which 
the emplo1ees are invited to obligate themselves 
througnout the lifetime of the plan will not ex-
ceed $300,000_59 . 
Pension trust investments must also be Checked 
with S.E.C. rulings even though the plan be exempt. 60 
House, 
Legal and tax pro bleills exist ·wi th every pension plan; 
.58 Blu~5rin~ing the 
Chlcago, 11 0, 73. 
59 Ibid, 74. 
60 Ibid, 74. 
Pension Plan, Commerce Clearing 
, 
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not to be sure in the same number or degree, as they vary 
according to the specific plan; but each plan has some. It 
is most important, therefore, if the plan is to function 
effectively, that these legal and tax problems be solved, and 
, 
this usually calls for expert advice. 
CHAPTER VII 
EFFECTS and TREIlDS OF PENSIONS 
Because pensions are a long range program it is 
praotically impossible to det~rmine as yet What the effects 
have been of the reoent pension plans. Although there have 
been pension plans in operation for over half a oentury in 
this country, it must be remembered that the dramatio growth 
of pensions has just ooourred within the past eight or nine 
years. Then too, a majority of these eight or nine years 
have been years of unusual inflation. 
We do know that many people have beoome muoh more 
aware of the pension problem. This is definiteJy a good 
effeot. Onoe we reoognize that there is a problem and define 
it we oan begin to tackle it. We may not as yet have found 
the correot answer, but we are making an effort. In our 
efforts to solve this problem we realize the problem is 
diffioult and oomplex. This too in a good effeot, beoause 
it should make persons stop and consider the broad implioa-
tions of pension plans upon the employer, and employee and 
sooiety. With this in mind, pensions should be studied and 
58 
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planned very carefully. 
Pensions have had their effect on labor laws and on 
colleotive bargaining and will oontinue to play a major role 
in labor relations. Th;se are some who feel that pensions do 
, 
not fit in favorably in oolleotive bargaining because of their 
long range implications and because of the many technioal com-
plexities inherent in pension plans. Since, however, it has 
been decided by the courts that pensions are within the proper 
scope of collective bargaining, and since unions seem to want 
to keep them there, it is doubtful if there will be any change 
in this respect in the foreseeable future. It is sincerely 
hoped that labor and management will not "horse trade" about 
pensions or use them as a football to display their respeotive 
, 
power. There is too much at stake for everyone. Eugene Whit-
more,6l editor of American Business, writes, 
• "Here then are the issues: Shall we fight out 
the security benefits in a long-drawn ~erriIla war-
fare with both sides sustaining fright~ul losses WhiCh 
will wipe out all probable gains for the next genera-
tion? Or will labor and management both rise above 
Ee~-ante unionism and penny-ante management and 
Join hands to conduct an intelligent study of pension 
and seourity plans?" 
61 Eugene Whitmore, American Business, November, 
I 
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Unfortunately, as yet, the hands have not been joined and the 
study has not been made together. 
The problem of financial security for the aged has 
has its effect on Social Security. The recent amendments to 
the Act which extended the coverage and increased the benefits 
stemmed from an acute awareness of this problem, although it 
is undoubtedly true that inflation also played a major role. 
Many of the recent plans have integrated their benefits with 
those of Social Security, and there appears a definite trend 
in this direction. This appears to be a sound approach, al-
though there is still the problem of including more workers 
under both Social Security and private pension plans. 
It is difficult to ascertain how employees have been 
affected by pensions. We do know that the benefits for those 
retiring have been inadequate in recent years, but this is due 
primarily to inflation. Will the benefits of re'cent pension 
• 
plans coupled with the increased benefits of Social Security 
be sufficient? It is well to point out here that while pen-
sions are an important part of the answer to old age security, 
they are not the complete answer. Even a plan providing liberal 
benefits may not be adequate in an inflationary era. The solu-
tion will not come by increasing benefits, but by halting in-
-61 
flation. 
How has the employee been affected by pensions on 
his job? ire do know that there has been discrimination aga.inst 
older workers due to recent pension drives. This is an extreme-
ly difficult problem for which no solution has been found as yet 
It is also difficult to tell as yet the effects of recent pen-
sions on the mobility of labor, or on job selection. The a.ge 
of the employee and the attitude that workers have toward pen-
sions and cost of living will affect his actions in these re-
gards. With today's high cost of living will a worker choose 
8. job that pays more and has less security over a job that has 
security and less money at present? As yet we do not know 
exactly how pensions are affecting workers in relation to their 
jobs. 
Although we can determine how much an employer is 
paying for his pension plan in a specific industry, we cannot 
be sure how this will affect profits, prices or wages. The 
problem of how the small employer is gping to provide sound 
and adequate pensions for his workers has not been solved 
satisfactorily. It has been and will be difficult to aJCU-
rately determine +'he benefits to the employer from a pension 
plan, although'there certainly will be definite benefits. 
E 
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It seems certain that the demand for more private 
pension plans will continue. People have become more aware 
of the basic problem, security for old age, and the unions 
seem to be continuing to demand that this problem be solved. 
At present many unions are insisting on plans that are funded, 
self-insured, non-oontributory, jointly administered and pay 
flat benefits integrated with Social Security. These unions 
have generally not demanded that the employees' rights be 
vested. They have, however, been doing some serious thinking 
on industry-wide or area·wide pension plans, and the U.A.W. 
is trying to have such a plan put into effeot in the Toledo 
a.rea. 
It seems quite certain that the unions will continue 
to press for pension benefits, but it is not oertain if they 
will oontinue to demand the same type of plan in the future. 
They may insist upon a different type of plan or benefits if 
• 
and when economio conditions change. 
It is evident that pensions playa major role in 
answering one of the serious problems confronting the United 
States today, namely, how to provide adequate economic se-
curity for an employee who has reached the age when he can no 
longer work. Pensions, to be sure, are not the complete 
63 
answer, but an important part of the answer. ~nile pensions 
are an answer, they are also a problem. They are a serious 
problem, because they involve the security of so many people 
for such a lonr, period of time and indireotly affeot many 
segments of our economy. They 'are a oo~nplex problem because 
they involve problems of actuarial science, financial and 
funding problems, legal and tax problems and labor relations 
and public relations problems. This means that pensions can-
not be put into operation quickly nor without thorough and 
detailed study and planning. With the government, the unions 
and management working together for the good of society, these 
problems can be solved, so that pensions may effectively per-
form their important function in providing economic security 
in old age. 
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